I. INTRODUCTION
No economist would disagree that an economy is affected by the decisions of its government, and that political instability is rarely associated with a sound economy. Political instability and poorly functioning economies are a hallmark of the Pacific Island nations, and the last decade has been marked by political instability (especially Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea) and a lack of economic development (especially Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu 1 ). As Duncan and Chand (2002) point out, ".. all Pacific Island countries.. are experiencing difficulties in generating better living standards for their peoples and the political instability is making economic development even more difficult" 2 . Duncan and Chand cite a number of factors that contribute to economic instability in the Pacific
Island nations, prime among them being high youth unemployment and low literacy rates.
The Commonwealth of Australia (2003) recently offered dollarization as a panacea to the economic ills of the Pacific, an idea which has been speculated upon by both academics (Duncan, 2002; De Brouwer, 2000) and journalists 3 alike. The Howard government is now encouraging Pacific Island nations to form unions and to amalgamate resources in an attempt to jump-start economic growth.
There has been much discussion in the last decade as to the suitability of various currency regimes to emerging markets. Modern wisdom in the field of currency regimes for less 1 Table 10 contains figures for GDP growth in the Pacific Island nations.
2 Duncan and Chand (2002) intervention in the kina (Duncan and Xu, 2000) , and it is perhaps best regarded as a managed float -a more detailed analysis, in the style of Calvo and Reinhart (2002) The PINs share many economic conditions in common -they are microeconomies, reliant on commodity exports and tourism for revenue; their economies are significantly affected by commodity export revenue variability (In and Onchoke, 1995) ; and they have been subject to much political instability and civil unrest (Duncan and Chand, 2002) . PINs were typically colonies for much of the last two centuries before recently achieving independence, which may explain to some degree the political upheavals of their recent history. They have extremely underdeveloped economies, and are substantial consumers of Australia's foreign aid budget. Australia is the second largest aid donor to the PINs, with Japan the largest donor and New Zealand the third largest (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003) . As a result, Australia and New Zealand take a somewhat proprietary view of the region, and Australia has recently been regarded as the neighbourhood "sheriff" by the United States 7 , although it is debatable whether Australians, much less Pacific Island inhabitants, are comfortable with this concept.
7 "We want to take off the sheriff's badge", The Canberra Times, 27 October 2003
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A range of currency regimes have been considered for the PINs, and indeed the Papua New Guinea kina was floated in 1993 with encouragement from Australia (Karunaratne, 1988 , Commonwealth of Australia, 1995 . At this time a floating exchange rate was generally regarded by economists as the most beneficial currency regime for a developing economy, but the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997 has seen a reassessment of this opinion 8 . Studies by the IMF and other prominent economic bodies have reassessed options such as currency boards, fixed pegs and dollarization in an attempt to stabilize small and emerging market economies without leaving them exposed to rapid fluctuations in their currencies which may damage their levels of trade. When discussing the problems of the Pacific Islands, dollarization to the Australian dollar is the most common proposal and indeed it is the only option considered in many papers. An alternative is the formation of a currency union, modeled perhaps on that of the Caribbean. Jayaraman (2003) examines this proposal but finds that a number of the preconditions for such a union, including levels of intra-country trade, correlations in export prices and factor mobility, are not satisfied and concludes that dollarization remains the most viable option.
In an attempt to find solutions to the economic dysfunction of the PINs, the Commonwealth of Australia (2003), taking its lead from scholarly debate, proposed that the a single economic and political community could be established, with the Australian dollar becoming the regional currency. There will be much political discussion, both within Australia and within the PINs, as to whether this is an appropriate idea. This study addresses some of the 8 See Frankel et al. (2001) for a summary of the discussion with respect to emerging markets. 
III. DOLLARIZATION
Dollarization is the process whereby a country foregoes its own currency and adopts that of another appropriate party. The seeming success of the European Economic Community and its single currency and the proxy nature of the US dollar as the unofficial official currency of many least developed economies, has perhaps encouraged the debate as to whether dollarization is a suitable solution for the problem of Third World economic instability.
During the 1990s many developing countries were urged by the IMF to float their exchange rates in an attempt to enhance economic development. However the position of the IMF has changed, partly as a result of the 1997 East Asia currency crisis, and in the early part of the new century the prescription for exchange rate regimes is less clear-cut. Issues such as currency boards, pegs and dollarization are back on the agenda and are being broadly debated in the circles of development economics.
9 Commonwealth of Australia (2002) The arguments in favor of dollarization in developing economies are outlined succinctly by Berg and Borensztein (2000) . Pegs and currency boards can become targets for currency traders and this is particularly problematic for small, fragile economies. By dollarizing to a large, liquid currency, the chances of falling victim to a speculative attack are significantly diminished. Likewise it is less likely that major investors with suddenly withdraw capital if there is no fear of a sudden or sharp devaluation. This argument suggests that the island nations of the Pacific would be less prone to speculative attacks and, more importantly, a significantly more attractive destination for foreign investment than has previously been the case if it were to use the Australian dollar as the official currency. Duncan (2002) proposes
Australian dollarization of the Pacific island nations as a method to reduce government costs, stabilize monetary policy (indeed, remove the monetary policy responsibility from the island nations) and fix interest and inflation rates to those of Australia. Additionally, as dollarization may eliminate the potential for sharp revaluations in the currency, at least with respect to the currency it is dollarizing against, the increased currency stability will promote increased trade between the economies. Arguments in favor of dollarization to the Australian dollar are based primarily on the fact that, in the past, Australia has been the major trading partner of the Pacific Island nations (de Brouwer, 2000) .
For better or for worse, "aussification" ties the countries of the Pacific to Australia, and once the process has commenced, dollarization is extremely difficult to reverse. Berg and Borensztein (2000) observe that the few cases of a reversal of dollarization are in newlyindependent countries, such as those of the former Soviet Union, and which were previously dollarized to inconvertible currencies. Alternatives, such as currency boards, may be changed
The Governor or the Sheriff? Pacific Island Nations and Dollarization Chakriya Bowman 9 as conditions merit. Of additional concern is the fact that in most discussions of Pacific dollarization there has been a very direct leap from the idea of dollarization to the implementation of the Australian dollar as the primary currency, rather than the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the New Zealand dollar or even the French franc, all of which may have equal claims for their adoption. Certainly when dollarization is discussed in economic literature, the US dollar is implicit in the term as the adopted currency. Certainly several countries already use the Australian dollar, but several also use the New Zealand dollar and the US dollar, and Japan is the largest donor of aid in the region. Any of these currencies could reasonably be adopted by the PINs.
A significant argument made in favour of dollarization in the Pacific is that it would result in interest rate stability. Duncan (2002) argues that interest rates would be "largely determined in Australia" 10 , and hence would offer some monetary policy stability to the PINs. However, it is unlikely that interest rates would be similar to those of Australia. Any issue of government debt would attract a risk premium due to the significantly greater risk of default, effectively increasing interest rates at a country level. While, as noted, dollarization may remove the ability of various governments to print currency as a way of managing deficits, it does not mean that the dollarizing nation immediately inherits the stability of the country to whose currency it is dollarizing. Certainly the issuance of bonds and their efficient servicing is a preferable way to manage government debt, but should a government choose not to play fair, and default on the bonds, the results are in every way as disastrous as the money- 10 Duncan, 2002, p. 145 The Governor or the Sheriff? Pacific Island Nations and Dollarization Chakriya Bowman 10 printing remedy. A cessation of capital inflow at that point is not improved simply because the capital is (not) in Australian dollars. Berg and Borensztein (2000) point out that the issue of dollar-denominated debt is effectively the same as dollarizing and then issuing government debt, as in each case the debt has eliminated exchange rate risk. Issuing US or
Australian dollar denominated debt would be a far simpler exercise for a Pacific Island government than going to the extreme of dollarizing the entire financial system. Further, when Berg and Borensztein examine the borrowing practices of Argentina, which has both peso-and US dollar-denominated debt, they observe that while a spread between the two types of debt exists, the interest rate of the US dollar-denominated debt is still significantly higher than that of developed countries, reflecting the default risk inherent in the bonds.
While dollarization may make borrowing a little cheaper for the Pacific nations, it will still come at a price higher than that which would be charged to Australia. It would also be difficult for many Pacific Island nations to find a buyer for their bonds -government fiscal management has not been a strength of these countries, and their ability to repay loans is questionable.
Seigniorage is also lost when a country dollarizes. While this may not account for a great deal of revenue, its loss may be felt keenly to a small economy such as those of the PINs.
Proposals for dollarization often include a sharing arrangement for seigniorage and it is anticipated that the Pacific Island nations would pursue such opportunities before agreeing to adopt any form of dollarization. It is possible that smaller nations, such as Australia or New
Zealand, would be more willing to share seigniorage with the Pacific -it is less likely that the US would be prepared to do this.
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An alternative to dollarization is the formation of a currency union. A currency union has the benefit of allowing the Pacific nations unity, while preserving their independence from former colonial powers. As such, it may be a preferable option and one which may be more palatable to Pacific leaders. Such a union would see individual members give up their individual currencies, and join a centrally administered organization much like that of the European Union. Berg, Borensztein and Mauro (2002) observe that a benefit of a currency union is improved central bank independence, and that it may also promote monetary and fiscal discipline as a central bank that is not disciplined will find it difficult to something level of confidence. They also point out that a common currency will promote intra-regional trade. Seignorage is retained, and a sharing arrangement could be negotiated between countries joining the union. Another benefit is that the currency union may serve to promote good governance practices throughout the region. Indeed, by promoting a common currency it is more likely that there will be subsequent improvements in central bank and governmental accountability as the PINs will be required to maintain credibility. The adoption of a foreign currency would eliminate this necessity -and less accountability is possibly not a scenario that is ideal for this region.
While Jayaraman (2003) failed to find compelling evidence in support of a currency union, recent work by Huang and Wei (2003) find that monetary regimes such as currency boards and dollarization are likely to fail in countries with high levels of corruption. They find that a "conservative central banker" is preferable to exchange-rate driven monetary regimes under corruption, and question the ability of low inflation targets and currency boards to motivate ethical behaviour in governments. This lends weight to proposals of a currency union in
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IV. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR DOLLARIZATION
While much discussion has taken place about the macroeconomic support for dollarization, little currency time-series work has been performed. It is interesting, therefore, to determine whether there is any support for the idea that the Australian dollar is a related currency to those currencies of the PINs -is there a "koala bloc" in the Pacific? It is to be expected that if there are significant trading relationships and economic ties between Australia and the PINs, then this will be reflected in their currency relationships. Studies of currency relationships generally fall into two categories: those using regression analysis, as per Frankel and Wei (1994) ; and those using cointegration analysis as per Aggarwal and (1996) . This study will use both methods, as per Bowman (2004 Bowman ( , 2005 .
Before using regression analysis, tests for stationarity should be made. Three unit root tests are used in this study: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF, 1981) (Baillie and Bollerslev, 1989; Bowman, 2005 The results of these tests (Table 2) indicate that unit roots are present in most series. The ADF and PP tests fail to reject the null of a unit root for any of the currencies examined, although the results differ slightly when the Zivot and Andrews test is used. Breakpoints are identified in the Papua New Guinea kina, the Solomon Island dollar and the British pound, and the null of a unit root is rejected in each case. If these currencies do in fact contain breakpoints, then ADF and PP results are likely to be misleading as they do not adjust for structural changes in the data, and that the null of a unit root can be rejected for these currencies.
Having confirmed that most currencies examined here are likely to be characterized as unit root processes, an initial investigation into currency relationships is made using a standard OLS regression as per Frankel and Wei (1994) , modeled such that Robustness checks can be made using cointegration testing. The Johansen (1991) test for cointegration is again commonly used in currency literature (Aggarwal and Mougoue, 1996; Zhou, 1998) to test for long-run relationships between currencies. However, if not modified to adjust for structural breaks, it may again misspecify relationships. The Gregory and
Hansen (1996) test for cointegration adjusts for structural breaks, again dynamically determining the location of the breakpoint to avoid arbitrary period selection. Overall, from both regression and cointegration testing, there is mixed evidence as to whether the Australian dollar is significantly related to the currencies of the Pacific Island nations. Regression analysis indicates that at least four of these currencies, including the floating Papua New Guinean kina, would be more suited to true dollarization (that is dollarization to the US dollar), which may provide a less disruptive replacement for their existing currencies. Indeed, these results imply a significant level of unofficial dollarization already exits. Cointegration testing, while offering a little more support for long-run relationships with the Australian dollar, finds equivalent support for the US dollar, and it should be noted that cointegration testing does not offer a ranking of importance, merely an indication of the existence of cointegration.
Johansen cointegration testing (
Correlations between the five PINs shed an interesting light on currency dynamics within the region (Table 6 ). The currencies of Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands are highly correlated with each other but not with the remaining countries, while the currencies of Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga are all highly correlated. This is an interesting result, particularly The most interesting change in Pacific import and export composition over the last ten years has been the increasing relevance of Asia, both for imports and as an export destination.
Conventional wisdom states that Australia is a significant trading partner for the PINs, and for this reason the Australian dollar is the most appropriate currency for dollarization (De Brouwer, 2000 , Duncan, 2002 . However, this has changed significantly over the decade. New Guinea's exports. It is possible that the PINs would now find it more appropriate to peg to the US dollar rather than the Australian dollar, which appears to be losing its significance as a trading partner, and is a trend that is likely to continue over the next decade. Overall, exports from Asia to Pacific Island nations (Table 7) have increased over the decade, while exports from Australia appear to be falling. Papua New Guinea remains the only country whose trade with Australia, in terms of both imports and exports, is greater than that with Asia. All other countries now export more to Asia than Australia, and Tonga, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands also import more from Asia than Australia. The evidence to support Australia's position as a dominant economy in the Pacific region is significantly weaker than that of a decade ago, and this fact alone is a good reason to reassess calls for the Australian dollarization of the Pacific.
V. CONCLUSION
With corruption and recurrent political and economic turmoil being features of the Pacific Island nations, the Australian government has raised the prospect of dollarization to the Australian dollar as a panacea for the regions ills. There has been some academic discussion about the perceived benefits of dollarization, and the weight of argument has fallen in favour of the concept. However, analysis of existing currency behaviours suggest that this may not be the best solution if significant structural readjustment is to be avoided. Ideal candidates for dollarization are small economies with close trade and economic links to the originating country. But evidence seems to suggest that trade links are changing in the Pacific, and it is less likely that the status quo will remain by the time the PINs dollarize. Dollarization to the US dollar, the de-facto standard in Asia, or a move to a common currency may be preferable alternatives to dollarizing to the Australian dollar. Further, recent contributions to the less developed economy currency regime debate such as Huang and Wei (2003) indicate that dollarization may not be the best regime for an emerging economy plagued with corruption.
Of course, there are many reasons why the Australian government may find it beneficial for the region to "aussify", rather than "dollarize". However, these reasons fall into the domain of political economy, rather than empirical economics, and there is evidence presented here that questions such enthusiastic support for the adoption of the Australian dollar. Certainly, if trends of the last decade continue, Asia is likely to become the dominant trading partner for most PINs, and many of the arguments that favour the use of the Australian dollar over other currency options may be overtaken by events. Notes: All currencies denominated in Swiss franc. The basic regression of equation (1) provides little support for the Australian dollar as a choice of basic currency. The greatest level of support is for the US dollar, with most currencies strongly linked. There is also more support for the British pound, which is significantly related to both the Tongan pa' anga and the Solomon Island dollar. Despite the levels of trade between Australia and the Pacific Island nations, the only currency with support for the Australian dollar is the Tongan pa' anga. The Japanese yen is not linked with any of the currencies during this period.
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